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Michael Woodford,  Columbia  University  and  NBER 
This chapter  makes an important  contribution  to the literature  on the 
advantages  and disadvantages  of central-bank  transparency.  The most 
influential  recent  contribution  on this topic  has been the analysis  of Mor- 
ris and Shin (2002),  who use a simple, highly stylized model of central- 
bank communication  to make the point that it is possible for full trans- 
parency  not to be the optimal policy. In the model of Morris  and Shin, 
the central  bank has (imperfectly  precise) information  about a random 
fundamental  state that is not directly observable by private decision 
makers,  but the value of which is relevant  to their decisions;  the ques- 
tion posed is how precise  a measure  of its information  it is desirable  for 
the central  bank to publicly reveal. Morris  and Shin point out that the 
mere presumption  that it would be desirable  to increase  the precision 
with which private decisions track  the unobserved fundamental  does 
not suffice to answer this question, for one can imagine circumstances 
under  which a more  precise  announcement  by the central  bank actually 
reduces  the average  conformity  of private  decision  makers'  actions  with 
the fundamental,  even though it increases  the precision  of each of their 
estimates  of the fundamental. 
If, for strategic  reasons,  decision makers  care  about the conformity  of 
their actions with the average actions of other private agents, and not 
merely  about  the conformity  of their  actions  with the fundamental,  then 
the fact that the central  bank's announcement  is common knowledge 
makes  it relevant  as an indicator  of what others'  estimates  are  likely to be, 
in addition to the information  that it provides about the fundamental 
itself. This leads private decision makers to base their actions more on 
the central bank announcement than on  their own  (idiosyncratic) 
sources  of information  about the fundamental,  which are known not to 
be observed  by others.  But  excessive reliance  upon the central  bank an- 
nouncement about the economy's state has the unfortunate conse- 56  Woodford 
quence  that  errors  in the central  bank's  information  come to affect  every- 
one's action  in the same way, and so cause aggregate  outcomes  to depart 
from conformity  with the fundamental,  whereas reliance  upon private 
information  would lead to individual  errors  that  would tend to cancel  in 
their consequences  for the aggregate  outcome. As a result, Morris  and 
Shin show that (on a certain  assumption  about  welfare)  it is possible for 
a less precise  announcement  by the central  bank  to achieve a better  out- 
come, because an announcement  that is understood  to be less informa- 
tive has less effect on people's actions. 
The practical  relevance  of this analysis  has been contested  by a num- 
ber of commentators,  but generally  by pointing to various special fea- 
tures of the Morris-Shin  example;  thus, Svensson (2006)  argues that  the 
parameter  values under which Morris  and Shin find transparency  to be 
suboptimal  are  not the ones most likely to be empirically  relevant,  while 
Woodford  (2005)  argues that the welfare measure under which trans- 
parency is suboptimal in their model is unlikely to correspond  to the 
private  objectives  of the people whose behavior  the model is intended  to 
describe.  The present chapter  instead offers a more trenchant  criticism, 
because it considers an abstract  model of information  revelation  by a 
central  bank,  and presents  results  that  depend little on arguments  about 
the empirically  relevant  magnitudes  of particular  parameters. 
The present  chapter  extends the analysis  of Morris  and Shin (2002)  in 
a number  of respects.  One that  is emphasized  more  than  I think  it should 
have been is the idea that the central  bank is required  to reveal at least 
part  of its information  about fundamentals,  as a consequence  of public 
announcement  of its interest-rate  target;  the authors'  central concern 
then becomes the question whether a central  bank should reveal addi- 
tional information  beyond  what is revealed  by the interest  rate.  There  is 
surely some validity to the observation  that central  banks must reveal 
some aspects  of their  view of current  conditions  through  their  policy ac- 
tions, even if they refrain  from  communication  of other  sorts;  after  all, a 
central  bank is not purely, or even primarily,  a news service, though 
Morris  and Shin treat  it as if it were. But the interest  of this observation 
derives entirely from the fact that (in the case that full transparency  is 
not optimal) it will create a tension between the considerations  that 
would otherwise determine  the optimal interest  rate decisions and the 
central bank's interest in strategic information revelation. Gosselin, 
Lotz,  and Wyplosz assume instead that the interest  rate  decision has no 
economic effects;  it is purely an announcement  of one particular  statis- 
tic from the central  bank's  information  set. Comment  57 
Since  the central  bank  is also assumed  to be free  to make  this  announce- 
ment any function  whatsoever  of its information  (there  is no meaning  at 
all to its being an interest  rate announcement  -  the meaning of the an- 
nouncement derives entirely from the correlation  that it happens to 
have with variables observed by the central bank, as a result of the 
bank's  policy with regard  to the announcement),  there  is no meaningful 
sense in which the necessity of revealing  some information  through  an 
interest-rate  decision represents  a constraint  on the central  bank's  com- 
munication  policy.  After  all, a central  bank  that  wishes not to reveal  any 
of its information  through  its interest-rate  decision  can simply set the in- 
terest  rate  in a way that does not depend on any information  that is not 
already  public;  if (as assumed in this chapter)  the interest-rate  decision 
has no consequences  apart  from the information  that it reveals,  there is 
no cost in acting in this way. This is obscured  in the present chapter  by 
the unmotivated  assumption  that the interest  rate  must be a determinis- 
tic  function  of the central  bank's  information,  with weights summing to 
one; if either arbitrary  randomization  of the interest  rate,  or a constant 
interest  rate  (zero  weights on each of the central  bank's  signals)  were al- 
lowed, as would be possible in reality,  it would be obvious that an- 
nouncement  of the interest  rate  need not reveal any information. 
But  in fact  none of the chapter's  interesting  results  depend on this as- 
sumption. The finding that under certain circumstances  it is optimal 
to reveal  only the interest  rate  should more properly  be phrased  as a re- 
sult that  in these cases it is optimal  to reveal only a single  summary  statis- 
tic, rather  than the central  bank's complete information  set. (There  is 
nothing important or interesting about the supposition that this sta- 
tistic should be an interest  rate;  in the case that the central  bank has an 
interest-rate  decision to make that  affects  the economy,  and must reveal 
it, the result about the optimality of the single statistic  will almost cer- 
tainly not apply.)  Under this reinterpretation,  the chapter's  results still 
hold, without any need to discuss information  revelation  by the bank's 
interest-rate  decision. 
A more substantive  extension of the Morris  and Shin analysis is the 
treatment  of the case in which both the central  bank and private deci- 
sion makers  have noisy observations  of several different  fundamental 
state  variables,  rather  than  assuming  a one-dimensional  fundamental.  It 
might seem that the extension to a multi-dimensional  fundamental  is 
only required  by the assumption  that  one linear  combination  of the cen- 
tral  bank's  information  variables  is necessarily  revealed by its interest- 
rate decision;  in that case, there only remains  a question about the de- 58  Woodford 
sirable  degree of transparency  when there  is more than a single dimen- 
sion of information  for the central  bank to reveal. But  in fact,  the multi- 
dimensional  case is of independent  interest.  For  it is only in this case that 
the authors  are able to obtain  a result  with the generality  of their  Propo- 
sition 1, according  to which (in the case that the precision  of the various 
signals is common knowledge) partial  transparency  is invariably  prefer- 
able to full transparency. 
This  very clever  argument  relies  on the fact  that,  in their  model, under 
full transparency  there  is only a single linear  combination  of the central 
bank's information  variables that would be used in private decisions. 
(This in turn follows from functional-form  assumptions  -  quadratic 
objectives,  linear constraints,  and normally-distributed  disturbances  - 
that make the optimal decision rules linear;  from the fact that the deci- 
sion problems of all private decision makers  are identical,  so that each 
uses the information  revealed by the central  bank in exactly the same 
way; and from the fact  that each private  decision maker  has only a one- 
dimensional decision to make.) This means that one can necessarily 
achieve as good an outcome under partial transparency  as under full 
transparency:  it is necessary  only to reveal the particular  linear  combi- 
nation of central  bank information  variables that the private decision 
makers  would actually  use, rather  than also revealing  redundant  infor- 
mation. But under partial  transparency,  it is also  possible to reveal only 
a single dimension of the bank's information  that differs from the one 
that  private  decision makers  would use under full transparency;  this al- 
lows the central  bank to manipulate  the information  of private  decision 
makers,  should this be desirable. 
Thus, partial  transparency  is a dominant  strategy,  in the sense that it 
allows the central  bank to achieve a superset of the possible outcomes 
under full transparency.  In the generic case, the equilibrium  under full 
transparency  is not fully optimal (owing to the common-knowledge  ef- 
fect  identified  by Morris  and Shin),  so that  some kind of manipulation  of 
private decision makers'  information  can improve upon that outcome; 
one thus concludes that full transparency  is strictly inferior  in the ge- 
neric  case. As the authors  note, this argument  does not rely on any par- 
ticular,  special choice of the loss function  used to evaluate outcomes;  it 
is only necessary that one be outside any of the special cases in which 
full transparency  leads to precisely the optimal allocation. This is a 
much stronger  result than the original  one of Morris  and Shin. 
Nonetheless, the result is far from conclusive, as far as the practical Comment  59 
question of the desirability  of transparency  in central  banking is con- 
cerned.  The result  still depends (at least for its generality)  on quite spe- 
cial assumptions  -  for example, on the assumptions that private deci- 
sion makers each have use for only a single dimension of the central 
bank's  information,  and that  this single dimension  is identical  in the case 
of each private  decision maker  -  and one may question  the relevance  of 
such assumptions  to the actual circumstances  of central  banks. In fact, 
Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz themselves provide an effective critique, 
pointing out that their first result depends on assuming that the preci- 
sions  of the various private  observations  are common knowledge, even 
though the values  observed  are not. In particular,  it depends on an as- 
sumption  that  the central  bank  knows enough about  the precision  of the 
private  information  of private decision makers (as well as their under- 
standing of the precision of the information that the central bank 
chooses to reveal)  in order  to be able  to predict  how they will react  to the 
information  that  it chooses to reveal,  and hence  to determine  the optimal 
single linear combination  of signals to reveal. If the central  bank is in- 
stead mistaken  about  the precision  of private  information,  and so incor- 
rectly  calculates  the optimal  partial  information  to reveal,  the result  can 
be worse than  would be achieved  by full transparency. 
This  is the other  important  extension  of the Morris-Shin  analysis  in the 
present  chapter:  relaxation  of the common-knowledge  assumption,  first 
to consider  a case in which the central  bank misestimates  the precision 
of the information  available to private decision makers (though they 
correctly  understand  the nature of their incomplete information),  and 
then to consider a further  case in which private decision makers also 
misestimate  the precision  of their  information.  In  both of the latter  cases 
there  are  ranges  of parameter  values for which full transparency  will be 
the optimal  policy. 
These  results  are  perhaps  not surprising;  essentially,  what is shown is 
that it may be desirable  to constrain  the central  bank not  to manipulate 
information  in the way that  it would otherwise  choose to, when the cen- 
tral  bank's  choice  would be based on incorrect  beliefs.  And here it should 
be remarked  that the analysis would be more interesting  if it were to 
consider  what a central  bank  should choose to reveal  that (correctly)  un- 
derstands  that  it does  not  know  the precision  of private  decision  makers'  in- 
formation,  rather  than assuming that the bank will choose what infor- 
mation to reveal on the basis of incorrect  parameter  estimates that it 
treats  as known with certainty.  (The  chapter's  frequent  references  to the 60  Woodford 
case that  it treats  as the case in which the central  bank  is uncertain  about 
private  signal precision  are  somewhat misleading,  as the central  bank  is 
not treated  as being uncertain  at all.) 
Genuine uncertainty  (as opposed to simple erroneous  belief) on the 
part  of the central  bank could be dealt with in various  ways. One might 
assume a prior  over various possible values for the vector  of precisions, 
and choose a communication  policy on Bayesian  grounds;  or one might 
assume only that  the vector  of precisions  is known to belong to a certain 
set, and choose a maxmin communication  policy relative to this set of 
possibilities, as in the robust policy analyses of Hansen and Sargent 
(2007).  Even without the assumption that the central  bank will naively 
act  on the basis of wrong beliefs  if it tries  to be clever  in its choice  of what 
to reveal, one might well conclude that a bank that recognizes that it 
does not know exactly what it is that private decision makers  need to 
know about  its information  should prefer  on that  ground  to reveal  more. 
But even if the results obtained  here do not yet provide a full explo- 
ration of the topic, the issues that the authors  raise are welcome ones. 
The standard literature  on the optimal degree of central bank trans- 
parency,  following Morris and Shin, conceives the problem as one in 
which the central  bank must decide whether or not to uncover  various 
pieces of information,  the meaning of which will be unambiguous  if re- 
vealed. In  fact,  practical  debates  about  central-bank  communication  pol- 
icy almost never concern questions such as whether a central bank 
should reveal statistics that it has collected relating to the state of the 
economy.  The real questions have to do with how much a central  bank 
should reveal about its own  decision  processes  -  something that the stan- 
dard literature  treats  as being so well understood  by everyone that  they 
require  no discussion. 
Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz introduce  a concern  of this kind when 
they suppose that the central  bank may have its own (mistaken)  esti- 
mates of the coefficients  Pk,  and then ask whether it is desirable  for the 
central  bank to make these estimates public. This can be beneficial,  in 
their analysis, by allowing private decision makers to better judge 
the information  content of the central  bank's announcement,  when it 
chooses to reveal  only part  of its information  set. In reality,  private  deci- 
sion makers  have not only to guess the meaning (in the sense of the sta- 
tistical  relation  to the underlying state of the economy) of central  bank 
announcements of a purely informational  character;  they also have, 
above all, to try to forecast future central  bank actions  that affect the 
economy. But it is certainly  true that a central  bank cannot take it for Comment  61 
granted  that its decision processes are already  perfectly  transparent  to 
the public,  without any need for explanation  on its part;  thus, the kind 
of issue that is represented  by the discussion here of the desirability  of 
revealing  central  bank  estimates  of the (3k  is very much one that  needs to 
become more central  to analyses  of central  bank  communication  policy. 
When this is understood  to be the real  issue, the arguments  of Morris 
and Shin lose much of their  force.  The question  of how the central  bank 
approaches  its decision  problem  -  and even the question  of how the cen- 
tral  bank  views the world  -  is unlikely  to be one about  which private  de- 
cision makers  have their  own, private sources of information,  to which 
they should  be paying more  attention  than  they do to what central  banks 
choose to reveal about the matter.  Instead, these are preeminent ex- 
amples of issues about  which the central  bank  is inevitably  vastly better 
informed  than anyone on the outside, so that there  need be no fear  that 
the common knowledge effect  will lead to insufficient  use of private  in- 
formation.  At the same time, it is clear  that  better  understanding  of how 
central  banks make their decisions can help private decision makers 
make  more  accurate  decisions,  owing to the substantial  impact  of mone- 
tary  policy on financial  markets  and on the economy more broadly.  For 
this  reason,  it is hard  to see why transparency  on the part  of central  banks 
about  such  matters,  to the  extent  that  it is possible  without  interfering  with 
the decision  processes  themselves,  should not be desirable. 
The difficult  questions about the benefits of transparency  arise from 
doubts about how well attempts at openness will be understood,  and 
from questions  about  how a bank's  own decision processes  are affected 
by the need to be able to give a public account  of those processes.  These 
are real  concerns,  and deserve to be carefully  weighed, but the analysis 
of Morris  and Shin does not help central  banks to think about them. 
They are not yet present in the analysis here, either. But the present 
chapter  represents  at least a step in the direction  of greater  realism,  by 
introducing  the possibility of differences  in how the central  bank and 
private decision makers  understand  the implications  of a central  bank 
announcement.  One hopes that future discussions of communication 
policy will go further  in this direction. 
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